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I Comments

I

"There's No Wrong Way to Make a
Family"1 : Surrogacy Law and
Pennsylvania's Need for Legislative
Intervention
SaraAnn C. Bennett*
Abstract
Surrogacy is an alternative reproductive technology that provides
persons unable to have children of their own the means to create life.
The use of surrogacy arrangements has skyrocketed over the past 20
years. The law, however, has not advanced as quickly. Because of the

ethical implications of having a mother gestate a child for another
person, along with the challenge surrogacy arrangements provide to

traditional notions of parentage, the majority of state legislatures have
shied away from taking a clear position on this controversial issue. As
such, many courts are left to decide the legal parentage of children born
1. BABY MAMA (Universal Pictures 2008).
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, The Dickinson School of
Law, 2014; B.A., Columbia University, 2009. I would like to thank my friends and
colleagues on the Penn State Law Review who helped me throughout this process, my
family-particularly my mother and father-who have been my biggest and most
encouraging fans, and my friends who have kept me grounded and self-aware in the most
positive way. I would not have been able to do this without their support and
encouragement.
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from surrogacy arrangements without any legislative or judicial
guidance, resulting in uncertainty for the parties hoping to participate in
and the children created from surrogacy arrangements.
This Comment discusses the current state of surrogacy law in the
United States and the need for legislative intervention in Pennsylvania,
specifically. The Comment recommends that Pennsylvania adopt a

statute that treats surrogacy arrangements as enforceable contracts and
provides a procedure through which surrogate contract parties can vest
parentage rights and custody in the intended parents. The adoption of
such a statute would protect the best interests of the surrogate carriers,
the intended parents, and, most importantly, the children.
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SURROGACY AND THE ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA, TRIPLETS

In 2002, Danielle Bimber entered into a surrogacy contract with
James Flynn in which she agreed to gestate a child for Flynn and his
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infertile partner.2 Pursuant to the contract, Bimber was impregnated4
3
sperm.
through in vitro fertilization with a donor's egg and Flynn's
Bimber bore a set of triplet boys ("the triplets") on November 19, 2003. 5
to
In violation of the surrogacy agreement, however, Bimber refused
6
transfer custody of the triplets to Flynn due to a change of heart.
In December 2003, Flynn initiated a custody dispute against Bimber
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Pennsylvania, seeking
sole custody of the triplets. 7 Bimber filed an answer and counterclaimed
for custody. 8 The Superior Court did not settle the custody dispute until
2006, when it awarded custody to Flynn and declared him the legal
parent of the triplets. 9
The Bimber-Flynn agreement and subsequent litigation highlight
serious deficiencies in Pennsylvania law with regard to how the
Commonwealth addresses the validity and enforceability of surrogacy
The difficulties associated with enforcing surrogacy
contracts.
agreements, however, are not unique to Pennsylvania.
Surrogacy is an alternative reproductive technology ("ART") that
gives persons unable to bear children of their own the means to achieve
parenthood. ' 0 The use of surrogacy arrangements as an effective means
of ART has almost doubled over the past ten years.l" The law governing
surrogacy contracts, however, has not advanced as quickly. There is no
federal regulation of surrogacy arrangements; instead, such regulation

2. J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
3. In vitro fertilization is "the procedure whereby an egg is fertilized by sperm
outside of a woman's body and the resulting embryo is then implanted into a woman's
uterus for gestation." In re Parentage of a Child by T.J.S. & A.L.S., 16 A.3d 386, 388 n.1
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (quoting STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 573 (25th
ed. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. J.F., 897 A.2d at 1266.
5. Id. at 1267.
6. id. at 1268-69.
7. J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 3 (C.P. 2004).
8. Robert E. Rains, What the Erie "Surrogate Triplets" Can Teach State
LegislaturesAbout the Need to Enact Article 8 of the Uniform ParentageAct (2000), 56
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 9 (2008).
9. SeeJ.F., 897 A.2d at 1281.
10. See Nolo's Plain-English Law Dictionary, Alternative Reproduction Technology
(Art) Definition, NOLO, http://bit.ly/VFxEa8 (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (defining ART as
"[a] general term for a collection of methods for conceiving children through medical
technology, including in vitro fertilization, ovum donation, donor insemination, and other
techniques"). ART provides infertile couples and single persons who want to become
parents with "new and unique" ways to do so. Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation,
Determinationof Status as Legal or Natural Parents in Contested Surrogacy Births, 77
A.L.R.5th 567, § 2a (2000).
11.

See

MAGDALINA

GUGUCHEVA,

COUNCIL

FOR

RESPONSIBLE

SURROGACY INAMERICA 3 (2010), availableat http://bit.ly/T5wEy3.

GENETICS,
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has been left to the states. 12 Nonetheless, few states have unambiguously
addressed the validity of surrogacy arrangements despite the complexity
of parentage issues that arise from surrogacy contracts, 13 the interstate
commercial nature of these transactions, 14 and the growing popularity of
these contracts.1 5 In states where a statutory void exists, courts are left to
determine in whom parentage rights vest. 16 In Pennsylvania, however,
though the General Assembly has left such a void, the courts have
refused to address the validity of surrogacy contracts absent a clear
legislative mandate.' 7 Therefore, the Pennsylvania General Assembly
needs to enact a statute that clearly addresses the validity of surrogacy
contracts and, more specifically, in whom parentage rights vest in
surrogacy arrangements.
12. Federal regulation of surrogacy arrangements is ideal in that it would create
clarity on the issue and uniformity between jurisdictions. That topic, however, is beyond
the scope of this Comment and previously has been addressed. See generally Emily
Gelmann, "I'm Just the Oven, It's Totally Their Bun ": The Power and Necessity of the
Federal Government to Regulate Commercial Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements and
Protect the Legal Rights of Intended Parents,32 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 159 (2011).
13. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach
to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 859-66 (2000)
(explaining that technological advancements in baby-making, particularly with respect to
surrogacy, have made parentage determinations increasingly difficult because of the
contractual nature of such arrangements vis-A-vis competing principles of parentage law
that originate from the traditional means of conception through sexual intercourse). The
differing ways in which courts have addressed surrogacy arrangements demonstrate the
tension between contract law and family law principles. Compare Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (implementing contract law principles to hold that the
intent of the parties at the time they entered the surrogacy agreement determined who
were the children's legal parents), with In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1243 (N.J. 1988)
(declining to allow a carrier to abandon her parental rights in a surrogacy contract by
claiming contractual obligations because doing so violated New Jersey's public policy
that prohibits parents from bargaining away their parental obligations).
14. See Katherine Drabiak et al., Ethics, Law and Commercial Surrogacy: A Callfor
Uniformity, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 300, 301 (2007) (explaining that the "severity of
discrepancies in each state's legislative scheme and the absence of state statutory
systems" paired with the ability to utilize the Internet as a means to match surrogates,
donors, and intended parents living across the United States "creates business across state
boundaries and causes direct jurisdictional conflicts").
15.

See COURTNEY JOSLIN & SHANNON MINTER, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND

TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 4:2 (2012), availableat Westlaw LGFAMLAW.
16. See, e.g., Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784-85 ("We are all too aware that the proper
forum for resolution of this issue is the Legislature . . . . However, in light of our
responsibility to decide this case, we have considered as best we can its possible
consequences."); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763-64 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1994)
(explaining that because Ohio's legal framework did not address parentage rights
resulting from surrogacy arrangements and because of the technological advancements
that made surrogacy a commonly used form of ART, the court needed to create precedent
that addressed the issue).
17. J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (refusing to rule on the
validity of gestational surrogacy contracts because "(t]hat task is for the legislature[,]"
and instead ruling on other grounds).
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This Comment will provide an in-depth examination of the current
status of surrogacy law in the United States to illustrate the need for
reform in Pennsylvania. Part II will discuss the legislative approaches to
surrogacy arrangements and the judicial interpretations of parentage
rights resulting from surrogacy arrangements. Part III will discuss
Pennsylvania's common law, legislative, and jurisprudential framework
that bears on parentage rights arising from surrogacy arrangements. Part
IV will explain why Pennsylvania should adopt a statute which (1)
validates and enforces surrogacy contracts and (2) provides a procedure
by which legal parentage of the children born pursuant to surrogacy
contracts vests in the intended parents. Part V will provide a conclusion
to the issues presented in this Comment.
II.

THE WHOS, WHATS, WHYS, AND WHERES OF SURROGACY LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES

For the purposes of this Comment, the relevant parties in a typical
surrogacy arrangement are: (1) the intended parent or parents; 1 8 (2) the
providers of genetic material, 19 meaning the egg donor and/or sperm
donor; and (3) the surrogate carrier ("carrier"). 20 These parties can
participate in either traditional or gestational surrogacy arrangements.2 1
A traditional surrogacy arrangement occurs when the carrier's own egg is
fertilized by sperm provided by a donor or the intended father through
artificial insemination. 22 In this relationship, the carrier and the sperm
provider are genetically related to the child produced.2 3 Even though the
carrier is genetically related, however, as a traditional surrogacy carrier,

18. An intended parent is a party who enters into a surrogacy agreement "with the
intention of becoming the legal parent of any resulting child." Raftopol v. Ramey, 12
A.3d 783, 784 n.1 (Conn. 2011). Intended parents can be single, see, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 47/10 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Pub. Act No. 98-589) (defining "intended
parent" as "a person or persons who enter into a gestational surrogacy contract..."
(emphasis added)), or in heterosexual or homosexual relationships. See, e.g., Elisa B. v.
Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005) (holding that under California's Uniform
Parentage Act, a child may have two parents, both of whom are women).
19. The donor's genetic material is also known as a "gamete." A gamete is "[a] cell
that participates in fertilization and development of a new organism .... " Johnson, 851
P.2d at 777 n.2 (Cal. 1993) (citing MCGRAw-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL TERMs 2087 (4th ed. 1989)).
20. See generally Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted
Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 602
(2002) (noting the potential for eight possible legal "parents" in a gestational surrogacy
arrangement, including the intended mother and father, the carrier and her spouse, the egg
donor and her spouse, and the sperm donor and his spouse).
21. Gelmann, supra note 12, at 160-61.
22. Campbell, supra note 10, § 2a.
23. Gelmann, supra note 12, at 161.
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she will give the child to the intended parents upon the child's birth.24
Gestational surrogacy arrangements, on the other hand, are those in
which a carrier conceives via in vitro fertilization using genetic materials
provided by donors and/or the intended parents.25 Unlike the children
produced from a traditional surrogacy where the carrier's own egg is
fertilized, gestational surrogacy offspring are not genetically related to
the carrier. 6 Three variations of gestational surrogacy arrangements
exist: 27 (1) a carrier is impregnated with the intended parents' genetic
materials; 28 (2) a carrier, who also can be the intended mother,2 9 is
impregnated with a donor's egg that has been fertilized with the intended
father's sperm; 30 or (3) a carrier gestates an embryo made from donors'
egg and sperm for genetically unrelated intended parents. 3
Today, due to "society's moral outcry" 32 against the idea of
intended parents paying biological mothers to sacrifice the parentage and
custody rights to their genetically related children, 33 gestational
surrogacy arrangements are more prevalent than traditional ones.34
24. Id. In In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), the carrier entered into a
traditional surrogacy arrangement with the intended parents wherein the carrier's own
egg was fertilized by the intended father's sperm through in vitro fertilization. In re Baby
M, 537 A.2d at 1235. Upon the child's birth, the carrier refused to give up the child to
the intended parents. Id. at 1237. As the Comment will later discuss, the Baby M court
determined that the carrier was the legal mother of the child. Id. at 1234; see also infra
Part II.B.I.
25. Campbell, supra note 10, § 2a.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993).
29. See, e.g., McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478 (App. Div. 1994)
(explaining that the carrier, who was also the intended mother, was impregnated through
in vitro fertilization with the zygote made from the carrier's husband's sperm and an
anonymous donor's egg).
30. See, e.g., J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
31. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998).
32. Gelmann, supra note 12, at 161.
33. See Newtothis, Comment to How Are the OLDER CHILDREN of Traditional
Surrogacy Doing??, SURROGATEMOTHERSONLINE.COM (July 27, 2010, 8:17 AM),
http://bit.ly/VFNHEY. In response to criticism of traditional surrogacy, a traditional
carrier stated the following: "I didn't give 'MY' kids away for money, I created a child
for someone else. I never have looked at my TS [traditional surrogacy] babies as 'just
eggs' and I also don't pretend they aren't biologically related to me .... I see only love,
not a commodity or sale." Id. Another traditional surrogacy carrier described traditional
surrogacy as "incredibly painful" and proposed a list of ways intended parents could
alleviate the suffering of traditional carriers after the child's birth. HopefulSM, Comment
to For the IP's via TS, SURROGATEMOTHERSONLINE.COM (Jan. 18, 2009, 10:46 AM),
http://bit.ly/ZpDmCO. But see Brian C., THE SON OF A SURROGATE (Aug. 9, 2006),
http://bit.ly/lbgrJlO (explaining that as a product of a traditional surrogacy arrangement,
he felt betrayed by his genetic mother (the traditional carrier) and believed that he was
treated as a commodity and not as a human being).
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Regardless of whether there is a traditional or gestational surrogacy
arrangement, a commercial element to the transaction often exists. A
commercial surrogacy arrangement is "a contractual relationship where
compensation is paid 351 to a surrogate [by the intended parent(s)] ... in
exchange for the surrogate's gestational services."' 36 In such contracts,
carriers typically agree to surrender their parentage and custody rights of
37
the children to the intended parents upon birth of the children.
Disputes arise when parties to surrogacy contracts challenge the legal
parentage of the children produced pursuant to the contracts. 38 Courts
must determine legal parentage in other contexts as well, including in
such circumstances when the carrier does not seek legal parentage.39
States address the regulation of surrogacy arrangements in one of
three ways: (1) by statute; (2) through state court adjudication; or (3)
absent legislative mandate, by courts refusing to address the issue. The
following discusses the existing ways in which states address surrogacy
arrangements.
A.

Legislative Approaches to SurrogacyArrangements

Despite the growing popularity of surrogacy as an alternative means
of reproduction,40 only 18 state legislatures have enacted statutes that

34. See Gelmann, supra note 12, at 161. Some courts have rejected the validity of
traditional surrogacy arrangements on public policy grounds. See, e.g., In re Baby M,
537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); see also infra Part II.B.1.
35. But see, e.g., WASH REV. CODE § 26.26.230 (2013) ("No person, organization, or
agency shall enter into, into, induce, arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in the formation
of a surrogate parentage contract, written or unwritten, for compensation.").
36. Drabiak et al., supra note 14, at 301.
37. See, e.g., J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (explaining
that the gestational carrier and egg donor agreed to relinquish all custody rights to the
intended father).
38. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (discussing how the
intended parents, who were also the genetic parents, sought a declaration from the court
stating that they were the legal parents of the unborn child when disputes arose between
them and the gestational carrier); J.F., 897 A.2d at 1270 (discussing how the gestational
carrier attempted to terminate parentage rights of the biological mother after birth of
triplets).
39. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that intended but genetically unrelated parents were legal parents for purposes of
the child support payments required as a result of the intended parents' divorce);
McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that the
intended mother, although genetically unrelated to the children, was their legal mother
and her claim in the custody dispute was equal to that of her ex-husband, who was
genetically related to the children).
40. See Kate Zernike, Court's Split Decision Provides Little Clarity on Surrogacy,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2012, http://nyti.ms/Wculwv. Gestational surrogacy has become so
mainstream that over 1,100 children are born from these arrangements each year, and
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statutes44
explicitly address surrogacy arrangements. 4' The 18 different
4
42
can be separated into three basic approaches : prohibition, 1 inaction,
and status regulation. 45 The following discusses these three approaches
and the various legal challenges that have been made to these laws.
1.

How Have Legislatures Addressed Surrogacy Arrangements?

The first and most restrictive legislative approach to surrogacy
arrangements is a prohibition statute. A prohibition statute expressly
invalidates all forms of surrogacy contracts.46 Specifically, traditional
and gestational contracts are deemed void and unenforceable even if the
intended parents do not compensate the carrier.47 Thus, in a custody
dispute arising from a surrogacy contract in a prohibition state, the
48
contract has no legal effect and courts will refuse to enforce its terms.

The courts then determine legal parentage status based on the best
interests of the child.49
The next, more permissive approach is an inaction statute. Unlike
jurisdictions that void all types of surrogacy contracts, states that have
celebrities such as Sarah Jessica Parker and Mitt Romney's son, Tagg, have spoken
publicly about utilizing this form of ART. Id.
41. JOSLIN&MINTER, supra note 15, § 4:2.
42. A fourth approach exists, known as "contractual ordering." Contractual ordering
uses contract law to resolve disputes arising from surrogacy contracts. Gelmann, supra
note 12, at 166. This approach, however, will not be discussed further for purposes of
this Comment. This Comment characterizes contractual ordering as the intent-based
judicial approach in Part II.B.3 infra.
43. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (Consol. 2009).
44. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
45. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 742.11-.17 (2013).
46. Gelmann, supra note 12, at 166. Some prohibition statutes impose civil and/or
criminal penalties on those persons who participate in the formation of surrogacy
arrangements. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-402(b) (2013) (imposing a maximum penalty of
$10,000 or one year in jail or both on anyone who violates the prohibition statute).
47. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) (West, Westlaw through 20132014 Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess.) ("No person may enter into, induce, arrange, procure
or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract."), declared
unconstitutionalby Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); D.C.
CODE § 16-402(a) ("Surrogate parenting contracts are prohibited and rendered
unenforceable in the District."); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West, Westlaw
through 2013 Reg. Sess.) ("A surrogate parenting contract is void and unenforceable as
contrary to public policy.").
48. See sources cited supra note 47.
49. IND. CODE § 31-20-1-3 (2013) (prohibiting the court from using the carrier's
involvement in the disputed surrogacy arrangement against her in a parenthood
determination based on the best interests of the child); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.861 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Pub. Act No. 119) ("The circuit court shall award
legal custody of the child based on a determination of the best interests of the child.");
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 124 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Ch. 340) (commentary).
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inaction statutes expressly prohibit some types of surrogacy contracts,
but leave open the possibility that courts will uphold others if
challenged. 50
Three states have inaction statutes:
Kentucky,51
5
2
Nebraska, and Louisiana. Louisiana and Nebraska prohibit all types
of compensated surrogacy arrangements. 54 Alternatively, Kentucky55
invalidates only compensated traditional surrogacy arrangements.
Unlike prohibition statutes, no inaction statute imposes civil or criminal
penalties 56on those who violate it; instead, the statutes only void the
contract.

The most permissive category of legislative approaches is the status
regulation statute. Status regulation statutes explicitly allow at least one
type of surrogacy contract.57 Similar to inaction jurisdictions, however,
status regulation statutes can also expressly void other types of surrogacy
contracts. 58 Ten states have status regulation statutes, 59 and there are
various ways in which those states' legislatures have chosen to restrict
the surrogacy alternatives permitted.60 Some states limit enforceable
surrogacy contracts to situations in which the intended parents are
married. 61 Others require that at least one intended parent 62 provide the
genetic material for the surrogacy. Although the majority of states that

50.
51.

See JOSLN & MINTER, supra note 15, § 4:2.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
52. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (2008).
53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
54. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (Westlaw) (stating that any surrogacy
whereby "valuable consideration" is paid to a carrier is void and unenforceable); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (stating that any contract that compensates a woman for bearing
a child of a man who is not her husband and sacrificing her parental rights is void and
unenforceable).
55. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Westlaw) (prohibiting persons from
participating in contracts that compensate mothers who agree to be artificially
inseminated and subsequently to terminate their parental rights to the resulting child).
56. See Gelmann, supra note 12, at 166.
57. See JOSLIN & MINTER, supra note 15, § 4:2.
58. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 14-18-01, -05, -08 (West, Westlaw through
2013 Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg.
Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess.) (allowing uncompensated surrogacy arrangements but
prohibiting compensated ones). The North Dakota legislature voided traditional
surrogacy contracts but explicitly established parental rights in the intended parents when
a child produced from the intended parents' gametes is born to a carrier in a gestational
surrogacy arrangement. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 14-18-05, -08 (Westlaw).
59. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2009).
60. JOSLIN & MINTER, supra note 15, § 4:2.
61. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2013).
62. See, e.g., id. § 742.13(6); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(a)(1)(E) (West, Westlaw
through 2013 Pub. Act No. 98-450); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17(1JI) (West,
Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(5) (2013); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-160(B)(9) (Westlaw).
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regulate surrogacy have status regulation statutes, little uniformity exists
between these statutes.63
2.

Are the Legislatures' Actions Constitutional?

Statutory regulations of surrogacy arrangements have been
challenged on constitutional grounds with varying degrees of success. In
Soos v. Superior Court,64 the Arizona Court of Appeals declared the
state's prohibition statute 65 unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds. 66 Noting that the statute made a gender-based distinction that
affected fundamental liberty interests, 67 the court used a strict scrutiny
analysis 68 to hold that the statute "denied... equal protection of the
laws" to birth mothers by allowing husbands to rebut the presumption of
paternity but not providing gestational mothers any means to prove
maternity.6 9 Similarly, in JR. v. Utah,7 ° the U.S. District Court for the
District of Utah found Utah's prohibition statute 71 unconstitutional as
applied to intended parents who were genetically related to the child born
of a gestational surrogacy arrangement. 72 The court dertermined that the
statute denied the genetic parents legal recognition of their "fundamental
rights as parents to raise the children they ha[d] conceived. 7 3 Further,
the JR. court drew upon the reasoning in Soos to hold that it was
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds 74 to conclusively establish
63. See JOSLIN & MINTER, supra note 15, § 4:2.
64. Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
65. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (West, Westlaw through 2013-2014 Reg. Sess.
& 1st Spec. Sess.). Arizona's prohibition statute voided surrogacy contracts and
established the birth mother as the legal mother of any children who resulted from a
surrogacy contract. Id. § 25-218(B). If the carrier was married at the time of birth, the
statute created a rebuttable presumption that her husband was the legal father. Id. § 25218(C).
66. Soos, 897 P.2d at 1361.
67. Id. at 1360 (explaining that the matters of procreation and childbearing are
fundamental liberty interests guaranteed by federal and state constitutions).
68. Id. A government can abridge fundamental rights only when the government
demonstrates that a "compelling state interest" is achieved through the restriction and the
"means are closely tailored" to achieve that interest. Doe v. Attorney General, 487
N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 463-64
(1972) (White, J., concurring)).
69. Soos, 897 P.2d at 1361.
70. J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002).
71. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(a) (repealed 2005) (stating that in any surrogate
parenthood arrangement, "the surrogate mother is the mother of the child for all legal
purposes, and her husband, if she is married, is the father of the child for all legal

purposes").
72.

See J.R., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1296.

73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 1294 (explaining that the statute, as applied to the facts of the case, allows

"M.R. [the genetically related father to] be listed as the father on the birth certificates of
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legal motherhood in the carrier.75 The disputed statute in JR. has since
been repealed 76 and replaced with a status regulation statute that permits
some types of gestational surrogacy arrangements in Utah.77
Despite the fact that Florida's legislature expressly permits
gestational and traditional surrogacy arrangements,7 8 in T.MH. v.
D.M. T,79 the Florida Court of Appeals deemed unconstitutional a
provision of the gestational surrogacy statute that required all gamete
donors to relinquish their parental rights to any children produced from
gestational surrogacy arrangements.8 ° Channeling the reasoning in Soos,
the Florida court deemed the provision unconstitutional as applied to the
facts of the case 8 l because it impermissibly abridged the appellant's
fundamental right to bear and raise children of her own.82

On the other hand, in Doe v. Attorney General,83 the Michigan85

84
Court of Appeals held the Surrogacy Parenting Act constitutional.

Michigan's Surrogacy Parenting Act prohibits all types of surrogacy
arrangements.8 6 The Michigan Court of Appeals determined that the
statute regulated the fundamental right to procreate, but found that the

the children born to W.K.J. [the carrier], an unmarried woman, but J.R. [the genetically
related mother] cannot be listed as their mother").
75. Id. ("This court is satisfied that Soos is well reasoned and that its conclusion is
sound. The State may not close its eyes to the fact of a parental relationship simply
because the parent happens to be a woman.").
76. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (repealed 2005).
77. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Spec.
Sess.).
78. See FLA. STAT. §§ 742.13-.15 (2013) (relating to gestational surrogacy); id. §
63.213 (relating to traditional surrogacy).
79. T.M.H. v. D.M.T, 79 So. 3d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). A lesbian couple
entered a gestational surrogacy arrangement wherein the appellant, one woman in the
relationship, provided the ova that were used to gestate a child by the appellee, the other
woman in the relationship. Id. at 788. Through this arrangement, the appellant was
related to the child by genetics and the appellee was related to the child by birth. See id.
" Id. After the birth of their
The two women "intended to raise the child as a couple ....
child, the mothers separated and a custody dispute ensued. Id. at 789.
80. See id. at 793 ("Interpretation and application of [FLA. STAT. § 742.14] by the
trial court to deny Appellant parental rights to her child cannot withstand strict scrutiny
and violates Appellant's constitutional rights to equal protection and privacy under the
United States and Florida Constitutions." (footnotes omitted)).
81. Id. at 788. Application of FLA. STAT. § 742.14 would have required the
appellant egg donor to sacrifice all of her parental rights to the child, despite the fact that
not only was she genetically related to the child, but she had raised the child together
with the appellee for two years before they separated. Id. at 789.
82. Id. at 792-93.
83. Doe v. Attorney General, 487 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
84. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.851-.855 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Pub.
Act No. 119).
85. Doe, 487 N.W.2d at 486.
86. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 722.851-.855 (Westlaw).
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871
Michigan legislature had "compelling government interest[s]i
sufficient to justify intrusion into [infertile couples' and prospective
surrogate mothers'] right to procreate in the surrogacy context[.] ' 88 As a
result, Michigan courts are constitutionally permitted to invalidate
surrogacy arrangements. 89 Due to the many variations of relationships to
which surrogacy statutes can apply and the varying court interpretations
of what constitutes "compelling state interest[s]" sufficient to justify
restrictions on constitutional guarantees, 90 these cases demonstrate the
inherent difficulty legislatures encounter in addressing the validity of
surrogacy arrangements.
Although these surrogacy statutes are a start to facilitating the ease
with which courts deal with disputed contracts and the determination of
parentage rights, states must provide greater clarity and consistency to
withstand scientific advancements. Some courts have sought to fill the
gaps created by the legislatures, but with mixed results.

B.

JudicialApproaches to ParentageRights in Surrogacy
Arrangements

When legislatures do not address the validity of surrogacy contracts,
and legal parentage resulting from such arrangements is in doubt, courts
will often step in to provide guidance. Courts typically use one of three
different standards to determine in whom parentage rights vest: (1)
93
92
gestational motherhood; 91 (2) genetic relationship; or (3) intent-based.
1.

Gestational Motherhood Standard

The gestational motherhood standard deems the woman who carries
and gives birth to a child as that child's legal mother, regardless of any
contract entered into stating otherwise. 94 Courts applying the gestational

87. Doe, 487 N.W.2d at 486-87 (noting three compelling interests for the state's
statutory prohibition of surrogacy: (1) to prevent children from being treated as
commodities; (2) to maintain the best interests of the child; and (3) to prevent the
exploitation of women).
88. Id. at 486.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 437 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 463 (1972) (White, J.,
concurring)).
91. See generally, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
92. See generally, e.g., Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1994).
93. See generally, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
94. Krista Sirola, Comment, Are You My Mother? Defending the Rights of Intended
Parents in GestationalSurrogacy Arrangements in Pennsylvania, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER
Soc. POL'Y & L. 131, 135-36 (2006).
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motherhood standard emphasize the traditional definition of mother 95 and
96
the "gestational mother's contribution to the fetus growing inside her."
The seminal case that brought surrogacy to the national spotlight is
In re Baby M. 97 In Baby M, the New Jersey Supreme Court voided a
compensated traditional surrogacy contract where the carrier's own egg
was fertilized with the intended father's sperm to produce a child for the
intended father and his infertile wife. 98 The court invalidated the
traditional surrogacy arrangement as contrary to public policy99 and a
violation of New Jersey's statutory framework. 100 In so doing, the court
determined that parentage rights could not be relinquished through
contract and thus declared the carrier the legal mother of the child. ' 0'
In A.H. W v. G.B.H.,12 the New Jersey Court of Appeals applied the
gestational motherhood standard provided by the Baby M court to a
gestational surrogacy arrangement where a carrier gestated a child
created from the genetic materials of the intended parents. 10 3 The
intended parents and the carrier sought a pre-birth order from the court
that would allow the doctor to put the intended parents' names on the
child's birth certificate. 10 4 The New Jersey Attorney General's Office

95. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., ConsideringMom: Maternity and the Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
601, 605 (2009) (explaining that there is a "presumption of biology" in the mother who
births a child, which the "ancient maxim mater est quam demonstrat (by gestation the
mother is demonstrated)" illustrates (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
96. Sirola, supra note 94, at 136.
97. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
98. Id. at 1234-35.
99. Id. at 1247-50 (equating compensated traditional surrogacy arrangements to
baby-selling, and finding that these agreements completely disregard the best interests of
the child, will be used for the benefit of the rich at the expense of the poor, and are
"directly contrary" to New Jersey's laws).
100. Id. at 1240.
The surrogacy contract conflicts with: (1) laws prohibiting the use of money in
connection with adoptions; (2) laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or
abandonment before termination of parental rights is ordered or an adoption is
granted; and (3) laws that make surrender of custody and consent to adoption
revocable in private placement adoptions.
Id.
101. Id. at 1243-44.
[I]t is clear that a contractual agreement to abandon one's parental rights, or not
to contest a termination action, will not be enforced in our courts. The
Legislature would not have so carefully, so consistently, and so substantially
restricted termination of parental rights if it had intended to allow termination
to be achieved by one short sentence in a contract.
Id.
102. A.H.W. v. G.B.H., 772 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
103. Id. at 949.
104. Id.
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opposed the request, claiming that a pre-birth order in this circumstance
contradicted the public policy of the State of New Jersey. 105 Despite the
unanimous support between the intended parents and the carrier for the
pre-birth order, the New Jersey Court of Appeals determined that a
carrier could not abdicate her parental rights to a child to whom she was
genetically unrelated until 72 hours after the child's birth.10 6 States that
prohibit all forms of surrogacy justify this harsh invalidation approach on
public policy grounds similar to those highlighted in the Baby M case.
2.

Genetic Relationship Standard

The genetic relationship standard states that those persons who are
genetically related to the children born of a surrogacy arrangement are
the natural and legal parents of those children. 10 7 This standard
emphasizes that the traditional ideas of parenthood come from "common
ancestry of genetic traits."'0 8 In Belsito v. Clark,'0 9 for example, the
intended parents provided the genetic materials to the intended mother's
sister who agreed to be the gestational carrier.110 The Ohio court held
that the genetic providers would be the legal parents of any child
produced by their genetic material, unless the genetic providers expressly
waived their parental rights to the child. "'
Custody disputes between intended parents and carriers are not the
only context in which courts utilize the genetic relationship approach in
recognizing parentage rights." 2 A New York court found this standard
persuasive in determining what parties would be named on the birth
1 3
certificate of a child produced from a gestational surrogacy contract.
Following the Baby M decision, the New York legislature deemed
surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable as a matter of public

105. Id.
106. Id. at 953-54 (relying on New Jersey's adoption statute and the carrier's
biological contribution "that determines how the child will grow" to come to this
conclusion).
107. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 767 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1994).
108. Id. at 766.
109. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1994).
110. Id.at 761.
111. Id. at 767 (noting that the parentage law recognizes that someone other than the
natural parent may assume the same legal status as the genetic parent, which is an idea
that should be applied when the gestational carrier wishes to raise the child she birthed,
but only with the knowing relinquishment of rights by the genetic parents).
112. See generally, e.g., T.V. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 929 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App.
Div. 2011).
113. Id. at 150 (holding that the trial court had authority to issue orders of maternity
to the genetic mother in gestational surrogacy arrangements when the birth mother and
genetic mother agreed that the genetic mother should hold legal parent status).
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policy. 114 In 1998, however, the New York legislature's "Task Force in
Life and Law" issued an Executive Summary stating that "the rights and
responsibilities in gestational surrogacy arrangements should reflect both
the genetic and gestational contributions to motherhood." ' 5 The Task
Force recommended that "if both the genetic mother and the [carrier]
mother agree, after the child is born, that the genetic mother should be
recognized as the child's sole legal mother, the law should provide a
mechanism for achieving that result efficiently, without the need for a
In evaluating the Task Force's
formal adoption proceeding." '1 16
recommendations, the New York appellate court applied this variation of
the genetic provider standard as an alternative means to establish legal
the carrier agrees
parentage in undisputed surrogacy arrangements where
7
the genetic mother should be the only legal mother. 1
Because the genetic motherhood standard determines parentage
rights based on who is genetically related to the child in a surrogacy
arrangement, it has significant shortcomings. Namely, in situations
where children are produced from the gametes of anonymous donors, in
a genetic relationship jurisdiction, the intended parents have no claim of
parentage rights to those children other than through adoption because
they did not contribute genetic material. 118 The following approach
attempts to resolve these deficiencies.
3.

Intent-Based Standard

The intent-based standard considers the persons who initiated the
creation of a child to be the child's legal parents. 1' 9 The California
Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert2 ° held this standard to be
determinative of parentage in a disputed gestational surrogacy
arrangement. 121 In Johnson, the intended parents were married to one
another and entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement with a
woman who agreed to gestate a child created from the intended parents'
sperm and egg.' 22 The carrier refused to relinquish custody of the child
after the child's birth, and the intended parents sued. 123 The Johnson
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 122 (Consol. 2009); see also T. V., 929 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
T.V., 929 N.Y.S.2d at 144 (quoting STATE OF N.Y. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EXECUTIVE
available at
SUMMARY OF THE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND LAW (1998),
http://bit.ly/YJFOvp) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id.
118. See Gelmann, supra note 12, at 179-80.
119. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
120. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
121. Id. at 782.
122. Id. at 778.
123. Id.
114.
115.
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court found that, under California law, motherhood can be established by
either giving birth to a child or by supplying the genetic material for that
child. 124 Because there were two legitimate legal mothers under
California law, the court found it necessary to consider the parties'
intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement. 125 In so doing, the
court explained that "[b]ut for [the intended parents'] acted-on intention,
the child would not
exist," and vested legal parentage with the child's
26
intended parents. 1
Another California court applied the intent-based standard to
resolve a similar dispute where the intended parents had no genetic
relationship to the child. 127 In In re Buzzanca, 128 the intended parents
entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement that provided for a carrier
to be impregnated with an embryo created from the gametes of two
anonymous donors. 129 Prior to the child's birth, the intended parents
divorced.130 The intended father disclaimed any parental rights and
argued that because he was not the legal father, he did not have to pay
child support. 131 The court disagreed, however, and applied the intentbased test to hold that the intended father was the legal father and, thus,
required to make child support payments. 132 The court examined the
state's artificial insemination statute, which makes the husband the
lawful father of a child born because of his consent to the artificial
insemination of his wife, 33 and concluded that "U]ust as a husband is
deemed to be the father of a child unrelated to him when his wife gives
birth after artificial insemination, so should a husband and wife be
deemed the lawful parents of a child after a surrogate bears a biologically
unrelated child on their behalf." 134 Thus, the intent-based approach
resolves those situations in which intended parents have no genetic
relation to children born of surrogacy arrangements.
Although few states' legislatures or courts have taken a stand on
surrogacy arrangements, the vast majority of jurisdictions provide no

124. Id. at 782.
125. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
126. Id.
127. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998).
128. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
129. Id. at 282.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 293 ("Even though [the intended parents] are [not] biologically related to
[the child], they are still her lawful parents given their initiating role as the intended
parents in her conception and birth.").
133. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 526 of 2013 Reg. Sess. and
all 2013-2014 1st Exec. Sess. laws).
134. In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.

"THERE'S No WRONG WAY TO MAKE A FAMILY"

2013]

The Commonwealth of
explicit legislative or judicial guidance.
Pennslvania is an example of such a jurisdiction.
III. THE WHOS, WHATS, WHYS, AND WHERES OF SURROGACY LAW IN
PENNSYLVANIA

Although Pennsylvania's statutory and common law have not
provided any guidance as to the validity of surrogacy contracts,
practitioners nonetheless consider the Commonwealth a surrogacyWhen dealing with surrogacy, there are three
friendly state. 13
mechanisms in Pennsylvania that can influence in whom parentage vests:
(1) the common law's traditional notions of parentage; 136 (2)
Pennsylvania practice, which includes the Commonwealth's Assisted
Conception Birth Registrations procedure13 ' and 139the Pennsylvania
38
Adoption Act; 1 and (3) Pennsylvania jurisprudence.

A.

Pennsylvania'sTraditionalNotions of Parentage

Pennsylvania's common law notions of parentage demonstrate the
Commonwealth's emphasis on the best interests of the child in
(1) the
These traditional notions are:
determining parentage.
presumption of paternity, (2) paternity by estoppel, and (3) in loco
parentis.140

The first notion, the presumption of paternity, presumes "that 14a1
child conceived or born during a marriage is a child of the marriage."
It is one of the strongest presumptions in Pennsylvania law. 142 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held, however, that this presumption
should apply only in those instances where the underlying policy of
preserving marriage would be promoted by its application.143 Although
the presumption's application to surrogacy arrangements likely would
See, e.g., Pennsylvania-A Great Surrogacy State, M. LAWRENCE SHIELDS III,
http://bit.ly/XUiSC6 (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) ("If one is a
prospective intended parent or potential [carrier] looking to become involved in a
surrogacy arrangement... Pennsylvania is an excellent state in connection with which to
").
do so for many reasons ....
136. See Sirola, supra note 94, at 139-42.
135.

ATTORNEY AT LAW,

137. PA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, POLICY & PROCEDURE FOR ASSISTED CONCEPTION BIRTH
REGISTRATIONS (2003) [hereinafter DOH ASSISTED CONCEPTION PROCEDURE LETTER].

138. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2312 (West 2010) ("Any individual may become an
adopting parent.").
139.

See infra Part III.C.

140. See Sirola, supra note 94, at 139-42.
141. Vargo v. Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459, 463 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding the
presumption of paternity inapplicable because the parties did not have an intact marital
relationship at the time of judicial review).
142. Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 179 (Pa. 1997).
143. Vargo, 940 A.2d at 463 (citing Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999)).
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not affect parentage determinations, 144 it relates to the Commonwealth's
interest in preserving families regardless of genetic ties. 145
Paternity by estoppel is another common law means by which the
Commonwealth has sought to protect the best interests of children by
preserving family units. 146 It is a legal determination that denies a man
the ability to disclaim paternity if he has held himself out to be the father
of the child to the community and the child, regardless of whether he is
genetically related to the child.147 The policy aim of estoppel emphasizes
' 148
that "children should be secure in knowing who their parents are."
Similar to the presumption of paternity, this notion of parentage
encourages a putative parent to maintain the established parent-child
149
relationship regardless of the genetic relation to the child.
Finally, in loco parentis status grants third parties standing to assert
custody disputes against natural parents of children. 150 It is true that
natural or biological parents have a prima facie right to custody in
disputes and Pennsylvania law considers all other persons "third
parties."' 151 Similar to the presumption of paternity and paternity by
estoppel, however, the legal concept of in loco parentis gives legal
parentage status to a genetically unrelated person if that person has put
"oneself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations
incident to the parental relationship without going through the formality
of legal adoption."'' 52 The purpose is to allow a person who has served
the role as parent to have a legitimate claim to custody if it would be in
the best interests of the child. 153 Third parties cannot put themselves in
144. See, e.g., Lynn v. Powell, 809 A.2d 927, 930 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (determining
that the presumption did not apply where the husband knew the child had been conceived
as a result of his wife's extramarital affair but remained married to her).
145. Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 180 ("[T]he presumption of paternity embodies the fiction
that regardless of biology, the married people to whom the child was born are the parents
....

"1).

146. Id. ("[Tihe doctrine of estoppel embodies the fiction that, regardless of biology,
in the absence of a marriage, the person who has cared for the child is the parent.").
Courts consider paternity by estoppel in paternity disputes only when it has been
established that the presumption of paternity is inapposite due to the circumstances.
Vargo, 940 A.2d at 464.
147. Vargo, 940 A.2d at 464.
148. Fish, 741 A.2d at 724 (quoting Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 180).
149. See id. at 723 (quoting Jones v. Trojak, 634 A.2d 201, 206 (Pa. 1993))
(discussing that where the principle of paternity by estoppel applies, blood tests
determining with certainty a child's paternity may be irrelevant).
150. JF.v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1274 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
151. Id. at 1273 (internal citations omitted).
152. Id. at 1274 (quoting Liebner v. Simcox, 834 A.2d 606, 609 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003)).
153. See Charles v. Stehlik, 744 A.2d 1255, 1258 (Pa. 2000) (holding that upon the
mother's death, the stepfather had in loco parentis status to assert a legitimate custody
claim against the child's biological father and that, after a detailed review of the
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loco parentis in defiance of the natural parents' wishes, however,
facie right to
because it would reward conduct that contradicts the prima
154
custody the Commonwealth grants biological parents.
While these three notions of parentage are important, they are only
one piece of the Pennsylvania puzzle.
B.

Pennsylvania Practice

In addition to Pennsylvania's traditional notions of parentage, there
are two means for intended parents to achieve legal parentage status in
the Commonwealth. 155 First, intended parents of gestational surrogacy
arrangements can achieve legal parentage through the Pennsylvania
Department of Health's Policy and Procedure for Assisted Conception
Birth Registrations ("DOH Procedure"). 51 6 Second, intended parents of
traditional surrogacy arrangements, 157 as well as those parents who did
158
can achieve legal parentage
not prevail under the DOH Procedure,
59
1
Act.
Adoption
under Pennsylvania's
The DOH Procedure applies only to gestational surrogacy
arrangements where at least one intended parent is genetically related to
the child. 16 ° It allows the intended parents in such an arrangement to
acquire an original birth certificate before the child's birth that identifies
the intended parents as the child's legal parents. 161 The procedure
circumstances, the biological father's right to custody did not outweigh the child's best
interests).
154. J.F., 897 A.2d at 1275-76 ("The requirement of a natural parent's participation
and acquiescence is critical to the determination of whether to accord a third party in loco
parentis status ....
The law simply cannot permit a third party to act contrary to the
natural parent's wishes in obtaining custody and then benefit from that defiant conduct in
a subsequent custody action." (internal citation omitted)). The JF. court denied the
carrier in loco parentis status because she withheld the triplets against the express wishes
of their biological father. Id. at 1274.
155. See Lawrence A. Kalikow, Surrogacy and the Law of Pennsylvania,
PASURROGACY.COM, http://bit.ly/URbwKN (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
156. Id.; see also DOH ASSISTED CONCEPTION PROCEDURE LETTER, supra note 137, at
1-2.
157. See DOH ASSISTED CONCEPTION PROCEDURE LETTER, supra note 137, at 1
(defining the "Assisted Conception" to which the DOH Procedure applies as "[t]he
implantation of a woman's fertilized egg into another woman (the gestational carrier)
who carries the child during gestation and delivers the child," necessarily implying that
the gestational carrier and child born bear no genetic tie (emphasis added)).
158. Kalikow, supra note 155. Because the DOH Procedure is not prescribed through
regulation or statute, it does not bind the courts. Sirola, supra note 94, at 142. Instead
discretion lies with the individual judges to decide whether to validate the parentage
requests. Kalikow, supra note 155.
159. Kalikow, supra note 155.
160. Id.
161. Id.; see also DOH ASSISTED CONCEPTION PROCEDURE LETTER, supra note 137, at
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requires:
(1) the intended parents to complete and submit a
Supplemental Report of Assisted Conception, and (2) a judge of
competent jurisdiction to issue an order stating that any certified copies
of the child's birth certificate will contain the names of the intended
163
parents. 162 Despite the non-binding nature of the DOH Procedure,
more than 30 Pennsylvania counties have issued such pre-birth orders. 164
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized and supported
the DOH Procedure in In re IL.P.165 The Superior Court noted that the
"law has not yet caught up with the science that makes conception by in
vitro fertilization ...

possible," and the DOH Procedure provides a

means to guarantee that a child born of a gestational surrogacy will have
at least one intended parent's name on the birth record. 166 Nevertheless,
the decision to enter a pre-birth order is within the individual judge's
discretion and a court
can deny the order, requiring the parties to pursue
67
alternative options. 1

When intended parents who either were denied a pre-birth order
pursuant to the DOH Procedure or are parties to a traditional surrogacy
arrangement seek to establish legal parentage status, they must proceed
under the Pennsylvania Adoption Act. 168 Pennsylvania allows those
intended parents who are genetically related to the child to initiate
stepparent adoption proceedings after the child's birth. 169 Stepparent
adoption is a far less onerous process than a typical adoption
proceeding. 170 Unlike in an adoption initiated by intended parents
unrelated to the child, the stepparent adoption does not require a report of
intention to adopt to be filed with the court, nor does it mandate a

162.

DOH ASSISTED CONCEPTION PROCEDURE LETTER, supra note 137, at 1-2. Court

orders issued pursuant to the DOH Procedure are known as "pre-birth orders." See
Lesbian Couples and Assisted Reproduction in Pennsylvania, Pre-Birth Orders, JERNER
& PALMER, P.C., http://bit.ly/l 1RCDGR (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
163. See sources cited supra note 158 and accompanying text.
164. See Kalikow, supra note 155. Although courts have issued the majority ofprebirth orders to intended parents who were both genetically related to the children
produced, more than 20 Pennsylvania counties have validated orders where the intended
mother was genetically unrelated to the child. Id.
165. In re I.L.P., 965 A.2d 251 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
166. Id. at 252. The Superior Court held that it was, and is, within the Orphans'
Court's jurisdiction to "alter, amend, and modify" the children's birth records, including
declaring that the gestational carrier and her husband have no parental rights to the child.
Id. at 258.
167. See sources cited supranote 158 and accompanying text.
168. See Kalikow, supra note 155. In 2002, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
expressly ruled that the Adoption Act does not preclude same-sex partners (or unmarried
heterosexual partners) from adopting. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202
(Pa. 2002).
169. Kalikow, supra note 155.
170. Id.
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preplacement investigation and home inspection before a court approves
the adoption. 171 Instead, the genetically
related parties only need to file a
72
petition for adoption with the court. 1

Similar to pre-birth orders, the decision to grant or deny any
adoption rests within the discretion of the court overseeing the
proceedings.' 73 If a court grants the adoption decree, the Pennsylvania
DOH will reissue a birth certificate that sets aside the original and
child's legal parents without
identifies the intended parents as the
74
reference to the surrogacy or adoption. 1
That both the DOH Procedure and the Pennsylvania Adoption Act
provide a means for intended parents to gain legal parentage is
informative. The DOH Procedure, although not legally enforceable,
demonstrates that the Commonwealth is not ignorant to the growing use
of surrogacy as an alternative means of reproduction and the legal
implications that stem from such arrangements. Further, in both the
DOH Procedure and the Pennsylvania Adoption Act, courts of the
Commonwealth legally validate and enforce the contractual nature of the
17
arrangement by granting legal parentage to the intended parents.
These procedures evidence the Commonwealth's inclination to permit
surrogacy and vest parentage and custody rights in the parties who
initiate the arrangement.
C.

Relevant PennsylvaniaJurisprudence

Although Pennsylvania courts have refused to expressly rule on the
77
76
validity of surrogacy contracts, 1 there is a practice of accepting them, 1
and relevant jurisprudence suggests that the courts may be more
favorable to honoring
the intentions of the parties who enter ART
78
arrangements.1

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2902(b) (2010).
174. Kalikow, supra note 155. Courts must treat their files relating to adoptions as
confidential and protected from public disclosure. PA. O.C. RULE 15.7.
175. See Kalikow, supra note 155.
176. J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1278 n.22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) ("We offer no
comment on the validity of surrogacy contracts in this state or any other."); id. at 1280
("We also decline to rule on the propriety of surrogacy contracts generally. That is a task
for our legislators.").
177. See, e.g., In re I.L.P., 965 A.2d 251, 258 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009); Kalikow, supra
note 155; see also discussion supra Part I1I.B.
178. See generally Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa. 2007) (holding
that the agreement between the birth mother and sperm donor absolving the sperm donor
of liability for child support so long as he agreed never to seek custody of any children
born to the birth mother was a valid and enforceable contract).
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The Superior Court of Pennsylvania first addressed a disputed
surrogacy arrangement in J.F. v. D.B., 7 9 which is the lawsuit filed by
80
Flynn, the biological father, against Bimber, the gestational carrier.'
The Superior Court refused to rule on the validity of surrogacy contracts
in general and on the disputed Bimber-Flynn contract specifically,
claiming that to be the responsibility of the Pennsylvania General
Assembly. 181 Notably, however, the court held that a gestational carrier
could never have standing to sue for custody of a child she birthed
pursuant to a gestational arrangement if there is at least one genetically
related parent involved. 182 The court reasoned that as a third party who
was not genetically related to the triplets, the gestational carrier could
have standing to sue the biological father for custody only if she held in
loco parentis status. 183 The carrier in JF. did not have in loco parentis
status because she withheld custody of the triplets against the will of
their biological father. 84 As discussed above, 85 a natural parent's
participation in and support of such arrangement is a "critical" factor in
determining whether to accord in loco parentis standing to a third
party. 86 Additionally, in a brief but significant footnote, the Superior
Court rejected the idea of granting standing to the carrier on the
gestational motherhood theory that declares the legal mother the woman
who bore the child. 187 Although this holding effectively bars a
genetically unrelated carrier from ever asserting custody against the will
of a genetically related intended parent, it is unclear how the court would
rule if a custody dispute arose from a traditional surrogacy arrangement
or how this holding would affect a custody dispute between a gestational
carrier and genetically unrelated intended parents.
The JF. court further held that the trial court erred in declaring
Bimber the "legal mother" of the triplets.i88 The trial court failed to
acknowledge that not only was the egg donor the biological mother to the
179. J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
180. See generally id.; see also supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
181. J.F., 897 A.2d at 1265. The Superior Court limited its holding by determining
that Bimber, the gestational carrier, did not have standing to seek custody or challenge
the father's custody. Id.
182. See id. at 1273-79.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 1276 ("Here, the manner in which gestational carrier [Bimber] obtained
custody of the children was fraught with impropriety .... ").
185. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing in loco parentis status and how
Commonwealth courts apply this notion of parenthood).
186. J.F., 897 A.2dat 1275.
187. Id. at 1280 n.25. The J.F.court "expressly decline[d]" to "rely on public policy
and conclude that gestational carrier should be granted standing simply because she
carried the children to birth." Id.
188. Seeid. at 1277.
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triplets, but she was also an indispensable party to the contract, and the
trial court provided her no notice or opportunity to be heard before
arbitrarily declaring Bimber the triplets' "legal mother., 18 9 Although the
decision failed to definitively rule on the validity of surrogacy
arrangements, it provides guidance regarding how the Commonwealth's
courts may treat them in the future, particularly where a gestational
carrier attempts to dispute custody based on her status as birth mother.
One argument against permitting surrogacy arrangements in the
Commonwealth asserts that surrogacy contracts allow parties to "bargain
away" children's rights in violation of Pennsylvania's long-standing
public policy. 190 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, found
the same objection unavailing with respect to an artificial insemination
pursuant to an in vitro fertilization agreement (the "Al Agreement")
wherein the sperm donor agreed to never seek custody of the children
produced so long as the mother never sought child support from the
donor. 191 In Ferguson v. McKiernan,192 the Supreme Court reiterated
that for a Pennsylvania court to void a contract on public policy grounds,
a very high burden must be met. 193 The Supreme Court did not find the
Al Agreement "contrary to the sort of manifest, widespread public
policy" that generally supports invalidating a contract.' 94 In fact, the
court stated that "[t]he absence of a legislative mandate coupled to the
constantly evolving science of reproductive technology" demonstrated a
complete lack of unanimous opposition to ART that would support
contract invalidation. 195 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rejected review of the J.F. case the year prior to the Ferguson
decision, 196 in light of Ferguson's dicta, it is likely that the Supreme
189. Id. at 1277-79.
190. See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 21 (C.P. 2004) ("[A] contract is void if it is
used to bargain away rights belonging to children." (citations omitted)). The trial court
originally voided the Bimber-Flynn contract because to do otherwise would allow
Bimber "to sign away her custodial rights without a time period to consider them or a
court hearing to address them," in violation of Pennsylvania's public policy. Id. at 22.
Because of its resolution of standing, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania did not find it
necessary to resolve the issue of whether the surrogacy agreement could constitute a
bargaining away of the triplet's rights. J.F., 897 A.2d at 1279 n.24.
191. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa. 2007) (noting that this was
not a typical anonymous sperm donation, but that the two parties were friends prior to
making the arrangement).
192. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).
193. Id. at 1245 n.16 ("'In the absence of a plain indication of that policy through
long governmental practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of obvious ethical or
moral standards, the Court should not assume to declare contracts ... contrary to public
policy."' (quoting Hall v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994))).
194. Id. at 1248.
195. Id.
196. J.F. v. D.B., 909 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 2006).
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Court would not void surrogacy arrangements on public policy grounds
if confronted with the question in the future.' 97
Ferguson's reasoning, if applied within the context of a disputed
surrogacy agreement, indicates that future courts may enforce such
agreements. The Ferguson court echoed the intended parent standard
described in Johnson v. Calvert19 8 when it stated that "[a]bsent the
parties' [ART] agreement,... the twins would not have been born at
all."' 199 In other words, had the parties not acted on their intentions, 20 0
there would be no children. The court discussed how although
Pennsylvania courts "narrowly focus" on the best interests of the child,20 '
such focus is not without limitation, and the competing policy of contract
enforcement should be given due regard where appropriate. 202 Because
there was no overriding public policy reason to invalidate the Al
Agreement, and because the trial court found that the Al Agreement had
been "bindingly formed," the Supreme Court held the contract valid and
enforceable.20 3
Pennsylvania cases not only indicate a lack of clear and
overwhelming public opinion against surrogacy, but they demonstrate
that Pennsylvania's common law, statutory, and jurisprudential
composition favors a practice of validating rather than nullifying such
contracts. Moreover, the framework supports adopting a statute that
emphasizes the intentions of the parties at the time they entered a
surrogacy contract in determining parentage. The following section
discusses how the General Assembly can best encompass the

197. Cf Commonwealth v. Cameron, 179 A.2d 270 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962). In
Cameron, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld an agreement wherein a biological
father agreed to bargain away his duty to support his child because the contract provided
that the natural mother and adoptive father, who had achieved in loco parentis status
through care of the child, would accept financial responsibility for the child. Id. at 272.
The court stated that when one parent agrees to release the other from support, "the
bargain will be enforced so long as it's fair and reasonable, made without fraud or
coercion, and without prejudice to the welfare of the child." Id. But see, e.g., Sams v.
Sams, 808 A.2d 206, 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding the post-nuptial agreement as to
father's child support payments to the mother to be unfairly made and, thus,
unenforceable because the mother was in desperate need of money when she agreed to
the terms of the contract and had no reasonable alternative to provide for her children).
198. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) ("But for [the intended
parents'] acted-on intention, the child would not exist.").
199. Ferguson,940 A.2d at 1248.
200. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
201. Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1248 & n.23 (acknowledging that by ruling in favor of
the sperm donor, the court effectively denies the children another source of support).
202. Id. at 1248 n.23 (noting that the best interests of the child focus does not
"operate to the absolute exclusion of all competing policies").
203. Id. at 1248.
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Commonwealth's current framework and secure a consistent approach to
surrogacy contracts moving forward.
IV. A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO PENNSYLVANIA'S SURROGACY
DILEMMA

Although Pennsylvania permits surrogacy arrangements and, when
deemed appropriate, legally validates such arrangements by vesting legal
parentage with the intended parents, the current framework still poses
significant uncertainty.
That uncertainty can have devastating
2
°4
consequences.
Unless state legislatures begin to address the multiple
issues involved in surrogacy contracts, it will be the children who are
"caught in a continual tug of war" between the parties who contracted to
have those children brought into the world. 20 5 To prevent disputes, such
as the one presented by the Bimber-Flynn agreement, from recurring,
Pennsylvania should adopt a statute that: (1) recognizes surrogacy as a
legally permissible alternative means of reproduction; (2) provides a
procedure by which surrogate contract participants can establish legal
parentage in the intended parents; and (3) implements the intent-based
standard to resolve any material disputes that arise.
Due to
Pennsylvania's existing framework, Pennsylvania is in a better position
than most states to adopt a statute that encompasses these requirements.
Despite the absence of any law addressing the issue, the
Pennsylvania General Assembly has not ignored the increased use and
growing relevance of ART procedures. In March 2005, the Pennsylvania
General Assembly established the Joint State Government Commission
Subcommittee on Assisted Reproductive Technologies ("Commission")
to review the state of ART law in Pennsylvania and provide
recommendations for how the Commonwealth should proceed with
respect to such arrangements. 0 6 The Commission, comprised of ART
experts and legislators alike, created The Proposed Pennsylvania
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act ("Proposed Act" 20 7).20 8 In

204. See Rains, supra note 8, at 32 (discussing the extreme financial and emotional
hardship that resulted from the disputed surrogacy agreement in J.F v. D.B., 897 A.2d
1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)).
205. J.F. v. D.B., 848 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (Slaby, J., concurring).
206. SUBCOMM. ON ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS., JOINT STATE GOV'T COMM'N, THE
PROPOSED PENNSYLVANIA ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES ACT 1 (2008)
[hereinafter PROPOSED ART ACT], availableat http://bit.ly/WzIP72.
207. The PROPOSED ART ACT contains five subchapters: Subchapter A: General
Provisions; Subchapter B:
Gestational Agreements and Prepregnancy Validation
Process; Subchapter C:
Gestational Agreements and Legal Parentage Through
Postpregnancy Process; Subchapter D: Child of Assisted Reproduction; and Subchapter
E: Records. For purposes of this Comment, "Proposed Act" will collectively refer to
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developing the Proposed Act, the Commission scrutinized the Uniform
Parentage Act, 0 9 statutory law, jurisprudence, Pennsylvania practice,
and the Pennsylvania Department of Health's procedures to conclude
that the General Assembly should recognize the validity of gestational
and traditional surrogacy arrangements,2 '0 and in doing so, vest legal
parentage with the intended parents.2 1
The Commission also
recommended that in the event of a contractual dispute between the
parties, the court should make its decision after giving "due regard" to
the parties' intentions at the time they entered the agreement. 212 The
following discusses why adopting the Proposed Act, with one suggested
addition, would protect the best interests of all parties involved in
surrogacy arrangements; how the Proposed Act codifies the current
Pennsylvania framework discussed in Part III; and whether the Proposed
Act would withstand judicial scrutiny.
A.

Adoption of the ProposedAct Would Serve the Commonwealth's
Best Interests

Enacting the Proposed Act would ensure uniformity in how the
Commonwealth addresses surrogacy arrangements.2 13 It would provide
security and stability to intended parents, carriers, and the resulting
children by guaranteeing a means by which the intended parents can
establish legal parentage. 214 Due to the constantly evolving nature of
reproductive technologies and the contract and family law issues that
attach to the use of surrogacy arrangements, the Pennsylvania General
Assembly should enact the Proposed Act, but with one minor change.

Subchapters A, B, and C, which are the three portions that specifically address surrogacy
arrangements.
208. PROPOSED ART ACT, supra note 206, at 1.
209. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002), availableat http://bit.ly/XiGJXC.
210. See PROPOSED ART ACT, supra note 206, at 28 ("The definition of 'gestational
carrier' applies under Subchapters B and C regardless of whether the adult woman's eggs
are used to conceive the child. Therefore, under both subchapters, the adult woman may
be genetically related to the child.").
211. See id. at 44. So long as the surrogate contract parties meet all of the procedural
requirements outlined in the Proposed Act, a "court shall issue a decree validating a
gestational agreement and declaring that each intended parent will be a legal parent of a
child born pursuant to the agreement .. " Id.
212. Id. at33.
213. See Drabiak et al., supra note 14, at 302 ("[G]reater specificity, uniformity, and
enforcement of legislation would reduce the necessity and frequency of adjudication and
provide clearer more consistent guidance for courts that are called upon to render
decisions on the fate of surrogate contract participants.").
214. See PROPOSED ART ACT, supra note 206, at 36-55.
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The purpose of the Proposed Act is to "protect the interests of
children" born from surrogacy agreements.2 15 Although the best interests
of the child should motivate parties to follow the Act's guidelines, the
General Assembly should not depend on this. To achieve this purpose
and encourage parties to adhere to the Proposed Act's extensive
procedures, 2 16 the Proposed Act should impose a civil penalty on parties
to contracts that are not court approved. Without any sort of deterrence
mechanism, "intended parents would have little incentive to diligently
comply with statutory requirements., 217 By imposing a punishment for
non-compliance, the Pennsylvania General Assembly takes a more
affirmative step toward securing the best interests of children born from
surrogacy arrangements.218
B.

The ProposedAct Implements Aspects of the CurrentPennsylvania
Framework

Pennsylvania's current common law, procedural, and jurisprudential
framework supports the Commission's conclusions to recognize the
validity of surrogacy arrangements, vest legal parentage in intended
parents, and adopt the intent-based standard to resolve contractual
disputes that arise from surrogacy arrangements.
Pursuant to the DOH Procedure, if a court chooses to grant a prebirth order, the court implicitly endorses the validity and enforceability
29
of
the surrogacy
contract.
Commission
Procedure
as a starting
point. The The
Proposed
Act makesutilized
bindingthe
the DOH
DOH

215. Id.
at 28.
216. The Proposed Act includes two routes by which the intended parents can
establish legal parentage of any child born from a gestational carrier. The parties can
obtain a decree establishing parentage rights in the intended parents either before the
carrier becomes pregnant, see id. at 36-47 (Subchapter B), or after the carrier becomes
pregnant and up to 90 days after the child's birth. See id. at 48-55 (Subchapter C). For
each route, however, the process is generally the same. The parties must create an
agreement stating that the carrier agrees to relinquish all parental rights and surrender
custody to the intended parents, and the intended parents agree to become a legal parent
of the child and accept custody of the child. Id. at 39. The gestational agreement must be
notarized. Id. at 38. The intended parents may petition a court to commence a
proceeding to validate the agreement. Id. at 43. The parties must then attend a hearing in
front of the court. Id. at 44. After the hearing, the court should issue a decree validating
the agreement as long as the parties have met the Proposed Act's requirements, the
parties entered into the agreement voluntarily, and "[aldequate provision has been made
for all reasonable health care expenses associated with the gestational agreement." Id. at
44-45.
217. Gelmann, supra note 12, at 191 n.304 (advocating for a criminal punishment
imposed on persons who fail to enter into a valid surrogacy contract pursuant to statutory
requirements).
218. Seeid. atl91.
219. See DOH ASSISTED CONCEPTION PROCEDURE LETTER, supranote 137, at 1-2.
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Procedure's recommendation that courts implicitly recognize the validity
of surrogacy arrangements. Moreover, the Proposed Act provides a
detailed process 2 -more onerous than that required by the DOH
Procedure-that the parties must follow to create a legally binding
Once a court validates an agreement, the
surrogacy agreement. 2
intended parents become the legal parents and the surrogate child's birth
certificate will bear the names of the intended parents.2 22 Unlike the
DOH Procedure,223 however, the Proposed Act allows courts to validate
both gestational and traditional surrogacy agreements.224
Further, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of the parties' intentions in deciding disputes that arise from
ART procedures.225 The Ferguson court explained that in light of the
ever-evolving state of ART and the contract-like properties that
necessarily attach to the use of such technologies, it would produce
absurd results if courts did not honor the intent of the parties when they
entered into the contract.226 The Proposed Act implements this reasoning
in the provision that requires a court to decide disputes that arise from a
surrogacy agreement by first considering the parties' intentions when
they entered the contract.227 Notably, the Proposed Act does not
mandate that a reviewing court consider only the parties' intent, leaving
it within a court's discretion to void the agreement if enforcing it would
be contrary to the best interests of the child.228
That the Proposed Act heavily relies on the Commonwealth's
current framework demonstrates that adopting the Act would not
significantly alter that framework. Instead, it would provide more
stability and predictability to the procedures, thereby protecting the best
interests of all parties involved in a surrogacy arrangement.
C.

The ProposedAct Would Likely Survive JudicialScrutiny

If enacted in full, the Proposed Act would likely withstand judicial
scrutiny. More specifically, it is unlikely that courts would find any
portion of the Proposed Act unconstitutional or in violation of
Pennsylvania's public policy against allowing parents to "bargain away"
their children's rights.
220. See supra note 216.
221. See PROPOSED ART ACT, supra note 206, at 36-55.
222. See id. at 45.
223. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 210.
225. Ferguson v. McKieman, 940 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa. 2007).
226. Id. at 1247-48.
227. PROPOSED ART ACT, supra note 206, at 33.
228. Id.
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The Proposed Act is similar to the Florida statute at issue in T.MH.
v. D.MT. that required donors to sacrifice all parental rights or
obligations to the resulting children. 29 Unlike the Florida statute,
however, the Proposed Act explicitly states that its definition of donor
does not include intended parents. 230 Thus, intended parents can donate
their gametes without fear that they will lose their legal parentage status
if their marriage dissolves.231

It is also unlikely that a court would invalidate the Proposed Act on
the basis that it violates Pennsylvania's public policy against allowing
parents to bargain away their children's rights. The Commission
specifically acknowledges that the Proposed Act should not be construed
to permit "dealing in infant children[,]" 232 which overtly violates
Pennsylvania public policy. Moreover, as the Ferguson court explained,
there exists a notable absence of opposition to the use of ART that would
justify invalidating an ART contract, let alone a statute enacted by
elected officials.233
Further, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that when one parent
agrees to release another from support, "the bargain will be enforced so
long as it is fair and reasonable, made without fraud or coercion, and
without prejudice to the welfare of the child., 234 The detailed process
that the Proposed Act requires participants to complete before a legally
enforceable contract is created ensures that no parties impermissibly
bargain away their children's rights.235
229. See generally T.M.H. v. D.M.T, 79 So. 3d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
(describing FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2013)).
230. Compare FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2013) ("The donor of any egg, sperm, or
preembryo, . . . shall relinquish all maternal or paternal rights and obligations with
respect to the donation or the resulting children."), with PROPOSED ART ACT, supra note
206, at 24 ("An individual who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted reproduction
The term does not include: (1) A husband who produces sperm, or a wife who
....
provides eggs, to be used for assisted reproduction by the wife. (2) An intended parent of
the child.").
231. See supra Part III.C.3 (discussing Pennsylvania's common law principle of in
loco parentis as a means to establish legal parentage). If a Pennsylvania court
encountered a situation similar to the one described in T.MH., regardless of whether the
Legislature had passed the Proposed Act, the appellant egg donor would likely have had
in locoparentis status due to the two years she spent raising the child.
232. PROPOSED ART ACT, supra note 206, at 35-36 ("Subsection [5905](c)(1) allows
for reasonable compensation and is intended to shield agreements that include payment to
the gestational carrier from challenge under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4305 (dealing in infant
children), which prohibits the dealing 'in humanity, by trading, bartering, buying, selling,
or dealing in infant children."').
233. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa. 2007).
234. Commonwealth v. Cameron, 179 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962).
235. See generally PROPOSED ART ACT, supra note 206, at 23-55. Courts cannot
validate a surrogacy agreement made pursuant to the Proposed Act unless the parties
fully understand the legal implications that will result from the contract's enforcement.
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The Bimber-Flynn surrogacy dispute in JF.v. D.B. exemplifies the
exact situation that the Proposed Act is designed to prevent. For the first
two-and-a-half years of their lives, the JF.triplets did not have any legal
parents. 36 They traveled back and forth between two families that each
gave them different names, and despite Bimber, the carrier, having raised
them for the majority of that time, the triplets currently have no contact
with her. 237 Had there existed legislation that enforced surrogacy
contracts made in the Commonwealth and clearly determined legal
parentage rights in such arrangements, the harm could have been
significantly diminished, if not eliminated.
V.

CONCLUSION

Surrogacy continues to be an ever-growing alternative means of
reproduction to which states cannot turn a blind eye without potentially
injuring children and interested persons alike. Because federal regulation
is unlikely, states need to take steps to delineate a clear position on the
issue.
Pennsylvania is well suited to validate and enforce surrogacy
contracts through legislation. The Commonwealth is in a unique position
because not only does it already have a surrogacy-friendly common law,
practice, and jurisprudential framework in place, but a subcommittee of
the Pennsylvania General Assembly has drafted legislation that is
tailored perfectly to fit the Commonwealth's needs. For all practical
purposes, however, the Commission completed the easy part. The
difficulty now remains in enacting the Commission's recommendations.
Regardless of how states decide to address surrogacy-whether it
be through prohibition, inaction, or status regulation statutes-the case of
the Erie, Pennsylvania, triplets sheds light on the devastating
repercussions that a state's complacency can cause.

See id. at 44. The intended parents must declare that they will assume "sole
responsibility for the support of the child" to ensure the child's welfare is protected. Id.
at 39. Although the courts cannot validate an agreement unless the facts show that the
parties entered the agreement voluntarily, id. at 44, the Proposed Act provides a separate
section that allows parties to challenge the validity of an agreement based on fraud or
duress. Id. at 34.
236. See Rains, supra note 8, at 32.
237. Id.

